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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the United States Supreme Court shifting both in its 
composition and how it interprets the First Amendment, the 
Minnesota Constitution’s provisions on religion and speech are 
poised to emerge from the mist.  It has happened before.  In 1990, 
after the Supreme Court reinterpreted the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise Clause, the Minnesota Supreme Court was first to use a 
state constitution to retain strict scrutiny as the relevant 
constitutional standard.1 
Today, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause may be 
ripe for reinterpretation.  Justice Clarence Thomas issued three 
concurrences in 2004 and 2005 suggesting that the Establishment 
Clause should not apply to the states.2  Last term’s conflicting five-
to-four holdings on where counties may post the Ten 
Commandments in courthouses adds to the confusion, which likely 
will be exacerbated as Justices depart and as some members of 
Congress and their constituents call for more religiousness in 
 
 1. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990) (departing 
from Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990)); Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An 
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 281 (1993) (explaining 
that Minnesota was first to “take a stand” against the weakened standard).  Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Washington followed.  See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 
63 (Me. 1992); Soc’y of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm’n, 564 N.E.2d 571 
(Mass. 1990); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
 2. Justice Thomas’s rationales are that states freely endorsed religion before 
the nation’s founding and that the Establishment Clause does not protect an 
individual right that states are bound to respect under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (urging a “fundamental rethinking of our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence”); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2126 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (observing that text and history suggest that Establishment Clause 
does not apply to state governments); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 50-51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that six states had 
established religions at nation’s founding).  The First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause, which commands that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion,” U.S. CONST. amend. I, was made applicable to state 
governments in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  Justice Thomas is 
not alone in advocating for Everson’s reversal.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-42 (1998); ROBERT L. CORD, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 100-01, 
143-45 (1982). 
2
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society.3  As for free speech, the Court struggled last term to define 
“government speech” 4 and refused to hear a case that could have 
helped standardize state and federal laws on when journalists may 
avoid subpoenas.5 
The Minnesota Constitution’s provisions that prohibit 
religious establishment and ensure self-expression through worship 
and speech stand ready to help.  But the state constitution often 
lies dormant in actions involving speech and establishment of 
religion.  When it is pled, the state’s courts frequently ignore the 
plain language and instead search for “framers’ intent.”  In 
addition, courts commonly use federal precedent to interpret the 
state provisions even though the state and federal constitutional 
provisions are markedly different and even though the state Bill of 
Rights protected Minnesotans decades before the First Amendment 
did.6 
To be sure, it seems inappropriate to use only the state 
constitution in many situations, such as when commercial speech 
or Internet pornography crosses state or national borders.  But in 
cases confined to Minnesota, such as those involving protest speech 
and nearly all things related to religion, the state constitution is 
well-positioned to balance competing interests and to enable 
Minnesota community standards to be imposed in Minnesota-
centric cases. 
The purpose of this Article is to increase awareness of the 
Minnesota Constitution’s religion and speech provisions by 
providing a practical resource for lawyers and judges who 
 
 3. McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); 
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives to Seek 
Voters’ Support for Commandments, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A18 (describing 
movement to introduce constitutional amendment ensuring school prayer and 
public displays of Ten Commandments). 
 4. Johans v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2064 (2005) (holding 5-4 
that beef producers may be compelled to subsidize federal “government speech” 
through advertisements). 
 5. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).  Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia 
have statutes protecting journalists from forced disclosure of confidential sources 
or newsgathering materials.  See id. at 978-79 (Sentelle, J., concurring); see also 
MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021-.025 (2004) (Minnesota’s shield law). 
 6. It is generally acknowledged that the First Amendment’s free-speech 
guarantees were extended to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), 
and the Amendment’s religion clauses in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940) and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 977, 1237 (2001). 
3
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prosecute, defend against, and decide religion and speech cases.7  
Part II examines the text and history of the state religion and 
speech provisions, explains that state action has been required even 
when the plain constitutional language does not demand it, and 
argues that gauging “framers’ intent” is unwise if not impossible.  
Part III discusses cases related to the state constitution’s provisions 
on establishment of religion, particularly in the school-funding 
context.  Part IV examines the well-developed “freedom of 
conscience” protections and explains when jurisdiction and 
standing are found not to infringe on religious exercise in cases 
involving churches.  Part V surveys the state constitution’s speech 
and press protections, which consistently have been interpreted to 
parallel the First Amendment. 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
A. Relevant Constitutional Texts and History 
States may enact constitutional protections stronger than what 
the United States Constitution ensures, and state supreme courts 
may interpret their constitutions in any way that does not violate 
federal law.8  However, “the state may not raise its constitutional 
protection for a particular civil liberty so far above the federal floor 
that it bumps against the federal floor for some other competing 
civil right . . . .”9  For example, if the Minnesota Supreme Court 
were to hold that protesters had a state constitutional right to 
protest on private property, it would risk violating the property 
owner’s First Amendment right against sponsoring speech with 
which the owner does not agree.10 
 
 7. The author is privileged to augment the practice-oriented materials in 
which the state religion and speech provisions are examined.  See MARY JANE 
MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2002) 
[hereinafter MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION]; John M. Baker, The 
Minnesota Constitution As a Sword: The Evolving Private Cause of Action, 20 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 313 (1994); Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota 
Bill of Rights: “Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist,” 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 56-57 (1984); 
Fred L. Morrison, An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 287 (1994) [hereinafter Morrison, Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution]. 
 8. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981); 
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19 (7th ed. 2004). 
 9. John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 234 (1994). 
 10. John Devlin, Constructing an Alternate to “State Action” as a Limit on State 
4
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Most of the Minnesota Constitution’s provisions related to 
religion and speech are found in article I, the Bill of Rights.  Article 
I, section 3 reads: 
The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and 
all persons may freely speak, write and publish their 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse 
of such right.11 
This language is original to the Minnesota Constitution of 1857.12  
Two-thirds of state constitutions have similar language.13  Unlike 
the First Amendment, article I, section 3 anticipates that a speaker 
may be punished and on its face does not require state action.  
Article I, section 16, the freedom of conscience clause, reads: 
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not 
deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the 
people. The right of every man to worship God according 
to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be 
infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, 
erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor 
shall any control of or interference with the rights of 
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by 
law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but 
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so 
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify 
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state, 
nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the 
benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological 
seminaries.14 
This language also is unchanged from 1857 and its origins are 
traced to the New York Constitution of 1777, which predates the 
federal Bill of Rights by fourteen years.15  While some state 
constitutions broadly protect “all actions stemming from religious 
 
Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique, and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 
820, 826 n.30 (1990); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (holding that private parade organizers need not 
include gay contingent because parade as a whole is expressive and the organizers 
have “autonomy to choose the content”). 
 11. MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 35. 
 12. Id.  
 13. State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 589 
N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999). 
 14. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 15. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J., 
concurring). 
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conviction,” those in Minnesota and New York are tailored toward 
protecting “worship.”16  It is common for state religion clauses to 
deny protections for practices that violate “peace and safety.”17  
Article I, section 17 prohibits conditioning public-office 
candidacies, voter eligibility, and judicial witness competency on 
religious belief: 
No religious test or amount of property shall be required 
as a qualification for any office of public trust in the state. 
No religious test or amount of property shall be required 
as a qualification of any voter at any election in this state; 
nor shall any person be rendered incompetent to give 
evidence in any court of law or equity in consequence of 
his opinion upon the subject of religion.18 
This section is substantively unchanged since 185719 and its 
religion-oriented provisions rarely litigated.20 
Although not in the Minnesota Bill of Rights, article XIII, 
section 2 is inseparable from this Article’s analysis.  It reads: 
In no case shall any public money or property be 
 
 16. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1456, 1460 (1990); see also RJ&L 
Religious Liberty Archive, State Constitutions, http://www.churchstatelaw.com/ 
stateconstitutions (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (compiling state constitutional 
provisions on religion). 
 17. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1464.  In a recent article, Utah Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Christine M. Durham observed that although the peace-and-
safety clauses sometimes are seen as restricting religious liberty, they “are more 
accurately interpreted as restrictions on state power.”  Christine M. Durham, What 
Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevancy of State Constitutional Religion Clauses, 
38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 359 (2004). 
 18. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 19. MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 128. 
 20. It appears that the Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed article I, 
section 17 in the religion context only once.  In State v. Peterson, the court 
affirmed, excluding evidence that a trial witness did not believe in God.  208 N.W. 
761, 764, 167 Minn. 216, 222-23 (1926).  In her treatise on the Minnesota 
Constitution, Professor Mary Jane Morrison references “unexplored tension” 
between Peterson and In re Collection of Delinquent Real Property Taxes, 530 N.W.2d 
200, 205 (Minn. 1995), where the Minnesota Supreme Court applied a “subjective 
test” to hold that an entity was not a church for tax-exemption purposes under 
statute or article X, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution.  Morrison observes 
that “probable resolution of this tension” may be found by concluding that 
a person may not be excluded from being a witness on account of her 
religious beliefs, but her beliefs may be subject of inquiry for credibility 
purposes should she take the stand to testify, at least when she is 
testifying in self-interest about being entitled to favorable tax treatment 
because of being a religious believer. 
MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 128-29. 
6
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appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein 
the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular 
Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or 
taught.21 
This section’s origins are traced to an 1877 constitutional 
amendment.22  It is sometimes characterized as among the anti-
Catholic “Blaine Amendments” that states adopted after 
Congressman James G. Blaine failed at amending the federal 
constitution in 1876 to prohibit aid to sectarian schools.23 
These provisions, along with the Minnesota Constitution’s 
Preamble,24 were for many decades the sole constitutional 
protections related to Minnesotans’ speech and religion rights.25  
Yet for most of Minnesota’s statehood, the provisions have lain 
largely dormant as courts held that individual rights were inferior 
to the state’s police power.  Ultimately, Minnesota’s failure to 
protect speech liberties under state law prompted the United States 
Supreme Court to incorporate the First Amendment’s speech 
clause through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.26 
 
 21. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. 
 22. MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 292.  In 
Locke v. Davey, the United States Supreme Court held that similar language in the 
Washington Constitution does not violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.  540 U.S. 712, 719, 725 (2004) (examining WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11). 
 23. Craig Westover, Constitutionality Is a False Issue, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, 
Feb. 22, 2005, at 6B (“Article 13, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution was born 
in bigotry”); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(Thomas, J.) (“This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.”).  The failed 
federal Blaine Amendment read: 
No state shall make any law respecting the establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in 
any State, for the support of the public schools or derived from any 
public fund therefor, not any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be 
under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or 
lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations. 
Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 38 
n.2 (1992) (citing 4 CONG. REC. 5453 (1876)).  Professor Green observes that the 
Blaine Amendment “does not fit neatly into a modern-day schemata.”  Id. at 41.  
Nevertheless, he cites authority indicating that the amendment was targeted 
toward Catholics who sought public money for schools they had established to 
counter “obvious evangelical Protestant overtones to public education.”  Id. 
 24. “We, the people of the state of Minnesota, grateful to God for our civil 
and religious liberty, and desiring to perpetuate its blessings and secure the same 
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”  MINN. 
CONST. pmbl. 
 25. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7, at 56-57. 
 26. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (under First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, invalidating Minnesota law permitting “nuisance” 
7
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After incorporation, state courts essentially ceded power to 
enforce individual rights to the federal courts.27  This was 
particularly true from the mid-1950s through the 1960s as Chief 
Justice Earl Warren steered the Supreme Court through landmark 
civil rights and First Amendment cases.28  One was New York Times v. 
Sullivan, which limited use of state defamation law to punish 
speech about public officials.29  Another was Sherbert v. Verner, which 
held state laws restricting religious free exercise to the strictest 
scrutiny.30  After Sherbert, a “subtle shift of emphasis in the state 
courts from state to federal constitutional law is observable,” 
including in Minnesota where “there was no longer any mention of 
the state constitution; it had, in effect, vanished from the 
[Minnesota Supreme Court] opinions’ texts and presumably from 
the court’s consideration.”31  The power of federal strict scrutiny 
“pushed state constitutional texts to the margins,”32 and “state 
constitutional analysis of free exercise claims was all but abandoned 
in the thirty years following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sherbert v. Verner.”33 
However, by 1977, the Supreme Court’s orientation toward 
individual liberties had weakened, and Justice William Brennan 
wrote a Harvard Law Review article urging states to employ the “font 
of individual liberties” in their state constitutions and not to view 
 
newspapers to be shut down); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (criticizing Minnesota law that prohibited antiwar 
speech). 
 27. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 379, 382 (1980); Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts 
and First Amendment Freedoms, 5 VAND. L. REV. 620, 642 (1951); see also 
Commonwealth v. Gilfedder, 73 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Mass. 1947) (observing that 
United States Supreme Court had occupied “the field” of free-speech law such that 
it would be “academic and futile” to examine Massachusetts constitution); Glover 
v. Minneapolis Bldg. Trades Council, 10 N.W.2d 481, 482, 215 Minn. 533, 535 
(1943) (“decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States control decision in 
the instant case” involving labor pickets of nonlabor job site). 
 28. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7, at 61; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 1, 35, 66 (1998). 
 29. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 30. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 31. Carmella, supra note 1, at 298. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Clauses of Their 
Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 
1017, 1019 (1994).  States traditionally were “far more comfortable” developing 
state constitutional precedent on religious establishment claims.  Carmella, supra 
note 1, at 319; Durham, supra note 17, at 362. 
8
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federal decisions as “dispositive of questions regarding rights 
guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law”:34 
Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well 
to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for 
only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-
reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies 
underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they 
properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when 
interpreting counterpart state guarantees.  I suggest to the 
bar that, although in the past it might have been safe for 
counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state 
courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also 
to raise the state constitutional questions.35 
State courts were then “deluged” with state constitutional 
claims, many related to search and seizure.36  Few were related to 
speech37—reflective, perhaps, of the United States Supreme Court’s 
aversion to a “paternalistic” approach to restricting speech.38  But 
the Minnesota Constitution’s protections for individual rights lay 
largely dormant.  This prompted Terrence Fleming (a former 
Minnesota Supreme Court law clerk) and Jack Nordby (a Twin 
Cities attorney and eventual Hennepin County judge) to write a 
1984 Hamline Law Review article aptly titled The Minnesota Bill of 
Rights: Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist.39  The authors criticized 
Minnesota attorneys for rarely invoking the Minnesota Bill of 
Rights and encouraged the bench to meet its “obligation” to 
employ the Minnesota Constitution independently.40 
Then, in 1990, the Warren Court’s opinion in Sherbert v. 
Verner41 was largely overruled as the Court held in Employment 
Division v. Smith42 that strict scrutiny no longer controlled most free 
 
 34. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491, 502 (1977). 
 35. Id. at 502. 
 36. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: 
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1031 (2003). 
 37. Devlin, supra note 10, at 831-34. 
 38. Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 585-86 (2004) (explaining that since 1976, 
antipaternalism—the idea that government is ill-equipped to control speech for 
citizens’ own good—“has percolated in most of the Court’s commercial speech 
cases . . . [and] has seeped into other areas of First Amendment law”). 
 39. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7. 
 40. Id. at 53, 57. 
 41. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
9
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exercise claims.43  “Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith, interest in state constitutional protections for religious 
liberty surged.”44  In light of Smith, the Court remanded State v. 
Hershberger, a case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court had held 
that Amish buggy drivers were exempted from certain traffic laws 
under the First Amendment.45  On remand, the Minnesota court 
became first in the nation to “take a stand” against Smith by 
employing the state constitution to preserve strict scrutiny in free 
exercise claims.46 
After Hershberger, the Minnesota Supreme Court endorsed 
independent state-constitutional standards for search and seizure,47 
equal protection,48 abortion funding,49 and right to counsel after 
drunken driving arrests.50  In 1994, the William Mitchell Law Review 
published its first issue dedicated solely to state constitutional law.51  
But the speech provision remained dormant.  While a handful of 
 
 43. Id. at 883-85 (distinguishing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).  
The Supreme Court has retained strict scrutiny for laws that purposefully restrict 
religious practices, such as those prohibiting animal sacrifice.  See Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 44. Durham, supra note 17, at 366. 
 45. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990) (remanding State v. 
Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989)). 
 46. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990); Carmella, supra 
note 1, at 281. 
 47. Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn. 1994) 
(departing from Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), a “radical 
departure” from Minnesota precedent prohibiting temporary traffic road blocks); 
In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 780-83 (Minn.1993) (departing from 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), a “sharp departure” from Minnesota 
precedent on when seizure occurs).  In recent years, article I, section 10 of the 
Minnesota Constitution has assumed independence from the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, even though the provisions are textually 
identical.  See State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005) (departing from 
federal cases on when a drug-detection dog may be employed to “sniff” outside a 
rented self-storage locker); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367-71 (Minn. 
2004) (departing from Fourth Amendment on squad-car detentions and police 
officers’ requests for consent to search); State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 
(Minn. 2003) (holding that police officers may not expand the scope of a routine 
traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Wiegand, 
645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002) (holding that reasonable suspicion is required 
before police officers may seize and perform a drug-detecting dog sniff on a motor 
vehicle). 
 48. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991). 
 49. Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 1995) 
(rejecting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)). 
 50. Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833-34 (Minn. 
1991). 
 51. 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227-588 (1994). 
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state supreme courts adopted independent free speech protections 
during the 1990s,52 the Minnesota Supreme Court signaled several 
times during the decade that article I, section 3 could offer 
protections greater than the First Amendment, but to date has not 
so held.53 
Still, the renewed interest in the state Bill of Rights prompted 
now-Judge Nordby to write of a “renaissance of constitutional 
recognition” in a Foreword he penned to a 2002 treatise on the 
Minnesota Constitution.54  Similar stirrings are being felt across the 
nation as state speech and religion clauses receive increased 
attention amid the unsettled First Amendment landscape.55  
According to Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Christine M. 
Durham, “generally, state constitutions currently afford a friendlier 
venue for litigants in religious liberty cases.”56  Retired Oregon 
Supreme Court Justice Hans A. Linde urges practitioners and 
judges to heed Hershberger and the primacy of state constitutional 
law: “the Minnesota story repeated what often happens when state 
courts have decided federal issues ahead of state issues: delay, 
needless costs, and often Supreme Court pronouncements that 
prove to have been unnecessary.”57 
 
 52. State v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737, 753-54 (Conn. 1995); Price v. State, 622 
N.E.2d 954, 956-57, 961, 964-65 (Ind. 1993); Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 
N.E.2d 1270, 1281 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); Moser v. 
Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284, 1285, 1287-88 (Or. 1993); Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 
1, 8 (Tex. 1993). 
 53. State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 799, 801 (Minn. 1999); Minn. League 
of Credit Unions v. Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, 486 N.W.2d 399, 403-04 (Minn. 
1992); State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992); Cohen v. Cowles Media 
Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992). 
 54. Jack Nordby, Foreword to MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 7, at xviii. 
 55. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Expressive Liberties in the State Courts: Their 
Permissible Reach and Sanctioned Restraints, 67 ALB. L. REV. 655, 688 (2004) 
(observing that while state constitutional contributions to freedom of speech 
issues “remain marginal in comparison to the multitude of First Amendment 
precedents,” they are a “welcome development” and “contribute, however 
sparingly, to the overall body of expressive liberties”); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free 
Exercise in the States: Belief, Conduct, and Judicial Benchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059, 
1059 (2000) (observing that state constitutions’ religious clauses “merit[] 
attention” given “the unsettled state of the guidelines that have marked the 
religion clauses of the [federal] Bill of Rights”). 
 56. Durham, supra note 17, at 370. 
 57. Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 215, 
218 (1992). 
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B. State Action 
By its “make no law” language, the First Amendment is 
triggered only by state action—when a government actor has 
infringed a person’s religious or speech liberties.58  Similarly, by its 
prohibition against “public money or property” going toward 
religious schools, article XIII, section 2 of the Minnesota 
Constitution plainly requires state action.59  But by its plain 
language, article I, section 3 does not require state action.60  And 
apart from article I, section 16’s prohibition against “preference . . . 
given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship,” 
the freedom of conscience clause also contains no state action 
requirement.61  Presumably, anyone who infringes a Minnesotan’s 
right to speak, write, publish, worship, or believe may be said to 
have violated the state constitution. 
As applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, the 
speech and religion clauses both require state action.  In Hill-
Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, a 1992 case 
that built on the strict scrutiny rule in Hershberger, the supreme 
court held that the relevant inquiry was whether a “state 
regulation” burdened religious exercise.62  In State v. Wicklund, the 
court’s most recent decision interpreting article I, section 3, it was 
observed that the state constitution “does not accord affirmative 
rights to citizens against each other; its provisions are triggered 
only by state action.” 63 
At issue in Wicklund was whether state constitutional rights of 
fur protesters (and accused criminal trespassers) were violated 
when they were denied access to the privately owned but publicly 
 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
265 (1964) (finding state action in state court’s application of state law to a civil 
action between private parties). 
 59. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. 
 60. Id. art. I, § 3. 
 61. Id. art. I, § 16. 
 62. 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992). 
 63. 589 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. 1999) (directing courts to gauge “whether 
the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious beliefs”).  When private 
action is at issue, state action under the Minnesota Constitution may be “found 
only where there is either a symbiotic relationship or a sufficiently close nexus 
between the government and the private entity so that the ‘power, property and 
prestige’ of the state has been in fact placed behind the challenged conduct.”  Id. 
at 802 (citing Brennan v. Minneapolis Soc’y for the Blind, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 515, 
528 (Minn. 1979)). 
12
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financed Mall of America.64  At the time, courts in California, New 
Jersey, Washington, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Colorado had 
used state constitutions to ensure speakers’ access to private 
shopping malls, amid the United States Supreme Court’s 
acquiescence.65  However, most courts confronting such claims had 
sided with the mall owners. 66  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
distinguished the Colorado decision as one involving activities “far 
more of a governmental nature” than the Mall of America case 
because government agencies had maintained offices in the 
Colorado mall, and police officers patrolled there during business 
hours.67  Accordingly, it appears uncertain whether the Minnesota 
Supreme Court would deviate from requiring state action for 
article I, section 3 claims.  But it is worth noting that the Mall of 
America is now patrolled by municipal police officers and contains 
a publicly funded light-rail station.68  
The court in Wicklund did not mention that Wisconsin had 
struggled with the identical issue twelve years earlier.  In Jacobs v. 
Major, a mall-access case in which dancers sought to depict nuclear 
warfare, a majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed that the 
state’s free-speech provision, which is nearly identical to 
Minnesota’s, is triggered only by state action.69  But three dissenting 
justices argued that the speech provision’s plain language does not 
require state action and astutely observed that the section 
immediately preceding it—which, as in Minnesota, forbids slavery 
and involuntary servitude with no mention of state action—would 
 
 64. Id. at 794-95, 803. 
 65. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 
447 U.S. 74 (1980); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991); 
Cologne v. Westfarms Ass’n, 442 A.2d 461, 483 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982); N. J. Coal. 
Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 771 (N.J. 
1994); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630 (N.J. 1980); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 
A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. 1981); Alderwood Assoc. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 
108, 115-16 (Wash. 1981);  see also Devlin, supra note 10, at 902 n.9; Note, Private 
Abridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 188 (1980) 
(arguing that state constitutions provide right of access to privately held public 
forums for expressive activity). 
 66. Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern 
Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 32 (1999). 
 67. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 802 n.8 (analyzing Bock, 819 P.2d 55). 
 68. See Mall of America: Guest Services, http://www.mallofamerica.com/ 
about_moa_guest_services.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); see also Alexander, supra 
note 66, at 1 (observing that malls represent “the downtown of yesteryear,” but 
that expression is controlled).  
 69. Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 846 (Wis. 1987). 
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be enforced irrespective of who is the actor.70 
Commentator John Devlin has proposed a framework apart 
from state action for imposing state constitutional speech 
limitations on corporations, associations, and similar entities 
“where the text and history of a particular constitutional provision 
fail to show that it was intended to bind only the state 
government.”71  Devlin suggests imposing liability when (1) the 
alleged infringer was not an individual “acting within a sphere of 
personal autonomy,” (2) a “significant right” is at issue, and (3) 
competing interests are balanced.72  Perhaps such a framework will 
take root if governments continue balancing financial incentives 
for traditionally public spaces to become privately controlled. 
C. Gauging Framers’ Intent 
Examining the United States Constitution to reflect “the 
public intentions of those who drafted and ratified it” is attractive 
to some and unworkable to others.73  As Cass R. Sunstein observed 
recently: “[w]hy should we be governed by people long dead?”74  
Gauging framers’ intent as to the Minnesota Constitution borders 
on futile.75  Well-documented is the chaos in 1857 when Democrats 
and Republicans held separate constitutional conventions that 
produced two documents, which were resolved by a conference 
committee that left little paper trail.76  Given that the Minnesota 
 
 70. Id. at 852 (Abrahamson and Bablitch, JJ., and Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
 71. Devlin, supra note 10, at 825. 
 72. Id. at 901. 
 73. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: 
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1, 10 (2002).  “After 
thorough and careful historical research, scholars disagree on the original 
meaning of almost every important constitutional provision.”  Id. at 14. 
 74. Cass R. Sunstein, Fighting for the Supreme Court: How Right-Wing Judges Are 
Transforming the Constitution, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at 31, 37.   
 75. But see MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 
14 (asserting that “drafters’ intent is key to [Minnesota] constitutional 
interpretation”).   
Minnesota courts are receptive to constitutional interpretations using 
history of  the constitutional text, including drafters’ views of that text, 
views of past legislatures as reflected in earlier statutes, and views of the 
courts not only to that provision but also as to related federal provisions 
when those views fairly clearly result from state reasoning rather than 
federal mandates. 
Id. at 15. 
 76. WILLIAM ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 79-82, 
98 (1921); MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 1; see 
also Douglas A. Hedin, The Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota’s 
14
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Constitution was restructured in 1974, today’s commentators do 
not even agree on how many constitutions Minnesota had, let alone 
how to decipher original meaning.77  Nevertheless, the state’s 
courts occasionally decide state constitutional issues on “framers’ 
intent.”78  In so doing, the courts risk ignoring that the Minnesota 
Bill of Rights applied to state residents well before most of the 
federal Bill of Rights did, and that state constitutional clauses 
influenced creation of the First Amendment.79 
A postmortem of State v. Wicklund helps demonstrate why 
“framers’ intent” is a red herring.  The case began in Hennepin 
County District Court, where none other than Judge Nordby 
denied the alleged protesters’ motion to dismiss but nevertheless 
issued a memorandum observing that the publicly financed Mall of 
America was bound to respect free-speech rights under article I, 
section 3.80  Judge Nordby explained that the plain language of 
article I, section 3 “affirmatively grants plenary rights” while the 
First Amendment does not, and he posited that the Minnesota 
Constitution’s framers were “intimately familiar” with the federal 
speech clause and found its plain-language limitation to 
Congressional actions “wanting.”81 
In holding that article I, section 3 does not apply to expressive 
conduct at the privately owned mall, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals observed that Judge Nordby had failed to delineate “the 
 
Constitutional Past, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241, 243-44 (2003) (doubting that 
originalism has a place in Minnesota constitutional analysis given the 
“dysfunctional” constitutional convention in 1857); Russell Pannier, Essay, 
Abraham’s Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 265, 293 
(2002) (criticizing Minnesota Supreme Court for mixing originalism with 
nonoriginalism); Simonett, supra note 9, at 239 (characterizing originalism as “not 
a particularly helpful approach” to the Minnesota Constitution). 
 77. See Comments on the Restructured Constitution of 1974, in 1 MINN. STAT. ANN. 
129 (West 1976) (explaining that restructuring was not a “revision”); compare 
MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 1, 12 (Minnesota 
has one constitution continuously in effect since 1857 and is among the nation’s 
oldest), with Nordby, Foreword to MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 7, at xvii (Minnesota has two constitutions), and Morrison, Introduction 
to the Minnesota Constitution, supra note 7, at 287 (“Minnesota has three state 
constitutions.”) (emphasis added).   
 78. See, e.g., Winters v. Kiffmeyer, 650 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 2002) 
(assessing what “framers” intended by judicial-appointment provision in state 
constitution). 
 79. Durham, supra note 17, at 354. 
 80. State v. Wicklund, Nos. 96-042987, 96-044022, 96-043061, 96-043228, 1997 
WL 426209, at *25 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. July 24, 1997). 
 81. Id. at *7. 
15
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[state constitution] framers’ reason for departing from the 
language of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”82  And 
in affirming the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
identified its “first consideration” as being “whether the significant 
difference in terminology between the federal and state free speech 
provisions suggests that the framers of the Minnesota Constitution 
intended the free speech protection to be more broadly applied 
than its federal counterpart.”83 
The appellate courts’ approaches can be criticized.  First, the 
courts did not follow precedent suggesting that article I, section 3’s 
plain language be examined before history.84  Second, the First 
Amendment’s speech clause was not made applicable to the states 
until 1925 or later, decades after article I, section 3 was adopted.85  
As Judge Nordby observed in his memorandum on remand, the 
issue was not why article I, section 3 should be read differently than 
the First Amendment, but “why it should be read the same.” 86 
The original intent behind article I, section 16 might be easier 
to gauge, given that the Minnesota Constitution’s Preamble 
expresses “grateful[ness] to God for our civil and religious 
 
 82. State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 589 
N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999). 
 83. State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 798-99. 
 84. See State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992) (holding that 
article I, section 3 case can be resolved “in the plain language of the 
constitution”); see also Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 
293, 311 (Minn. 2000) (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (observing that the 
“majority’s analysis ignores the constitution’s plain language”). 
 85. See sources cited supra note 6.  In Wicklund, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s “brief historical journey” revealed that the “framers” were concerned with 
libel suits, not with protest speech, and that article I, section 3 was “copied from 
elsewhere”—facts that, according to the court, compelled the conclusion that 
article I, section 3 was to be read no more broadly than the First Amendment.  589 
N.W.2d at 799.  The court of appeals similarly criticized the district court for 
failing to identify “the framers’ reason for departing from the language of the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”  576 N.W.2d at 756. 
 86. State v. Wicklund, Nos. 96-042987, 96-044022, 96-043061, 96-043228, 1997 
WL 426209, at *10 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000).  In his twenty-six-
page memorandum, Judge Nordby also observed that the State had improperly 
appealed from a ruling in which it had prevailed on the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, and he characterized his constitutional observations as “unimportant 
dictum [that] has now been transformed into law.”  Id. at *1, *3.  “The Supreme 
Court’s opinion betrays a lack of interest in, knowledge of, and respect for the 
Minnesota Constitution.”  Id. at *13.  Ultimately, in a bench trial, Judge Nordby 
found the protesters not guilty because the State had not proven criminal intent.  
See id. at *22-26. 
16
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liberty . . . .”87  In addition, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which 
applied to Minnesota before statehood, directs that Minnesota’s 
future laws be based on “civil and religious liberty,” that no one 
should be “molested on account of his mode of worship or 
religious sentiments[,]” and that “[r]eligion, morality, and 
knowledge . . . shall be forever encouraged.”88  Still, determining 
whether the “framers” intended for article I, section 16 to be 
stronger than the First Amendment is imprudent because “the free 
exercise clause at the federal level was itself modeled on free 
exercise provisions in the various state constitutions.”89 
Oregon’s Justice Linde observes that because state 
constitutions have much in common with common law, originalism 
should yield to a more “institutional” approach that “derives 
constitutional law from the practice of judicial review rather than 
judicial review from constitutional law.”90  “Fidelity to a constitution 
need not mean narrow literalism.  Most state bills of rights leave 
adequate room for modern applications, as well as for comparing 
similar guarantees elsewhere.”91  But even under such an approach, 
state courts are likely to continue importing federal standards for 
their state constitutional analyses.92 
Minnesota courts must not ignore the “clear meaning” of the 
state constitution’s religion and speech clauses,93 but must confront 
 
 87. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990) (citing Preamble 
as among history that “supports a broad protection for religious freedom in 
Minnesota”). 
 88. ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 9; NORTHWEST ORD. §§ 13, 14, arts. 1-2, 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nworder.htm.  But relying on the 
Northwest Ordinance too much for today’s interpretations might be unwise, given 
that the document based legislative representation on the number of “free male 
inhabitants” in a district.  NORTHWEST ORD. § 9. 
 89. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1485.  “[S]tate constitutions provide the 
most direct evidence of the original understanding [of freedom of religion], for it 
is reasonable to infer that those who drafted and adopted the first amendment 
assumed the term ‘free exercise of religion’ meant what it had meant in their 
states.”  Id. at 1456. 
 90. Linde, supra note 57, at 226-28. 
 91. Id. at 228. 
 92. See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620 (Wis. 1998); see also infra  
notes 123-125 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 843-44 (Wis. 1987) (observing, in a 
case involving the Wisconsin Constitution’s speech clause, that the court “has the 
power, perhaps the duty, to make sure that the protections of our state 
constitution remain relevant in light of changing conditions, emerging needs and 
acceptable changes in social values, but such action must be consistent with the 
clear meaning of the constitution”). 
17
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the language with analyses relevant to today’s society without rigid 
adherence to original intent.  On this point, State v. Hamm94 is 
instructive.  In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
determined that “framers” of the Minnesota Constitution intended 
for a criminal defendant to be afforded a twelve-person jury, but 
conceded that “[w]e would no longer interpret the word ‘men,’ for 
example, to apply only to free white men, despite the framers’ 
intent.”95 
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION 
A. Commandments and Crèches 
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause commands that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”96  When first made applicable to the states in Everson v. 
Board of Education, the Supreme Court observed that the “First 
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.”97  The 
Clause’s “clearest command”—as articulated in Larson v. Valente, 
where the Court invalidated a Minnesota law that distinguished 
religions that receive half their contributions from nonmembers—
is that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred 
over another.”98 
But the wall between church and state is hardly impregnable, 
and Establishment Clause jurisprudence is, in Justice Thomas’s 
estimation, “in hopeless disarray.”99  Several constitutional tests 
have emerged, sometimes producing results bordering on the 
absurd: a government-sponsored holiday display that includes baby 
Jesus is okay, but only if room is left for reindeer, clowns, and 
elephants.100  In 2005, the Supreme Court obscured the analysis 
even more by issuing fact-specific, conflicting holdings on how and 
 
 94. 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988). 
 95. Id. at 385-86 (examining article 1, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution 
(amended 1988)). 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 97. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 98. 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
 99. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 n.1 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 100. See Allegheny County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 685 (1984). 
18
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where a county is permitted to display the Ten Commandments in 
courthouses.101 
Apart from school-funding issues,102  the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has had little opportunity to remedy the disarray with the 
state constitution.  Cases interpreting article I, section 16 are of 
little precedential value.  In an 1898 opinion by Justice William 
Mitchell, the court upheld a no work-on-Sundays law as consistent 
with the state’s police power to enact a “sanitary measure.”103  In its 
1927 opinion in Kaplan v. Independent School District of Virginia, the 
court held that it would be a “strained construction” to interpret 
article I, section 16 as prohibiting daily Bible readings in public 
school.104  In an unpublished decision from 1997, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals invoked federal precedent to hold that a 
Minnesota statute criminalizing car sales on Sundays does not 
constitute impermissible establishment of religion under article I, 
section 16.105  In 2004, the Minnesota Supreme Court avoided the 
state constitutional establishment issue while examining a rule 
requiring Minnesota attorneys to attend “elimination of bias” 
seminars including panels such as “Understanding Islam and 
Working with Muslim Clients” and “Enhancing Your Knowledge of 
Somali and Islamic Cultures.”106 
 
 101. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (maintaining Ten 
Commandments monument outside courthouse permissible); McCreary County v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (posting Ten Commandments 
inside courthouse impermissible). 
 102. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 103. State v. Petit, 77 N.W. 225, 226, 74 Minn. 376, 379 (1898), aff’d, 177 U.S. 
164 (1900). 
 104. 214 N.W. 18, 20, 171 Minn. 142, 148 (1927).  “What more natural than 
turning to that Book for moral precepts which for ages has been regarded by the 
majority of the peoples of the most civilized nations as the fountain of moral 
teachings?”  Id. at 18, 171 Minn. at 144.  Kaplan remains good law but never has 
been cited as persuasive authority.  See Michael K. Steenson, Essay, Pledging 
Allegiance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 747, 772, 775 (2003) (characterizing Kaplan as 
“simply of historical interest” and not a “standard for current cases”). 
 105. Kirt v. Humphrey, No. C1-96-2614, 1997 WL 561249, at *5 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 9, 1997) (upholding section 168.275 of Minnesota Statutes under 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961)).  “Although the genesis of Sunday closing laws was religious, over time 
such laws have evolved into secular laws devoid of their once religious bases.”  Id. 
 106. In re Rothenberg, 676 N.W.2d 283, 292 (Minn. 2004).  The court held 
that the requirement survived First Amendment Establishment Clause scrutiny, 
and then characterized the article I, section 16 inquiry as involving only an 
ungrounded claim involving free exercise of religion, making no mention of 
article I, section 16’s prohibition against preference for religious establishment.  
Id. at 293-94. 
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The slate is blank in Minnesota as to whether placing the Ten 
Commandments or similar religious symbols on public property 
violates the state constitution.  This is not so in several other 
states.107  California and Colorado have invoked their state 
constitutions to forbid religious displays from public property,108 
while Florida, Louisiana, and Oklahoma have held to the 
contrary.109  The Oregon Supreme Court undertook a rather 
tortured inquiry in 1969 and 1976 before essentially holding that 
the question is best resolved under the First Amendment and not 
the state constitution.110  In interpreting language nearly identical 
to article I, section 16’s prohibition against “any preference . . . to 
any religious establishment or mode of worship,” a divided 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a city’s annual Christmas 
display was permissible because “[t]he display is not a place of 
worship, it is not a ‘ministry,’ [and] no ‘preference’ is given to ‘any 
religious establishments’ or modes of worship[.]”111 
With the First Amendment’s establishment clause on unsure 
 
 107. See generally Linda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: 
Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 625 (1985) (surveying litigation involving state constitution establishment 
clauses). 
 108. Fox v. City of L.A., 587 P.2d 663, 663-65 (Cal. 1978) (holding that “huge 
cross” illuminated on city hall during Christmas and Easter violated state 
constitutional provision forbidding laws “respecting an establishment of religion”); 
Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 666, 671, 675 (Colo. 1983) 
(holding that plaintiffs had established prima facie case that city-sponsored crèche 
violated state constitution). 
 109. Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833, 834-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), rev. 
denied, 207 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) (rejecting non-
Christian taxpayer’s claim that state constitution forbade cross on county 
courthouse, and resolving case under First Amendment); State v. Morrison, 57 So. 
2d 238, 240-47 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that state constitution permits 
religious statue on public property, and observing that there was no federal 
question); Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789, 792-93 (Okla. 1972) (holding 
that a fifty-foot cross on city fairgrounds did not go toward “use, benefit or 
support” of religious institution). 
 110. Lowe v. City of Eugene, 451 P.2d 117, 122 (Or. 1969) (holding that cross 
on city land was permissible under state and federal constitutions), argued on reh’g, 
withdrawn, 459 P.2d 222, 224 (Or. 1969).  After the city’s voters accepted the cross 
as part of a war memorial, the Oregon Supreme Court held that “changed 
circumstances” and newly enacted federal precedent necessitated that the cross be 
allowed, apparently under the First Amendment. Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. 
City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 340, 342, 346 (Or. 1976). 
 111. King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 517 N.W.2d 671, 683 (Wis. 1994).  Two 
dissenting justices wrote that religious rights would be “enhanced, not diminished” 
by holding the city’s display improper under the state constitution.  Id. at 688 
(Heffernan, C.J., and Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
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footing, litigants may be emboldened to revisit article I, section 16’s 
prohibition against religious establishment. 112  Given the dearth of 
state constitutional law on article I, section 16’s establishment 
clause, state courts are apt to use First Amendment precedent as a 
starting point. 113  But they should not ignore cases from other 
courts that have interpreted language substantially similar or 
identical to Minnesota’s establishment clause.  For cases that fail to 
reach outside Minnesota’s borders—as would be the situation in 
most if not all establishment-of-religion situations—it seems 
appropriate for Minnesota courts to develop state constitutional 
case law that respects the rights of religious establishments but also 
the desires of Minnesotans who wish not to support such 
establishments. 
B. Religion, Schools, and Taxes 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not been idle in 
interpreting article XIII, section 2, which prohibits public money 
from being used to benefit religious-school education.  Two cases 
from the 1970s suggest that courts should parse the constitutional 
language closely to ensure that the state’s interest in education is 
not trumped by “incidental” benefits to religious schools. 
In Minnesota Higher Education Facility Authority v. Hawk, the 
court upheld public refinancing of debts that three private colleges 
with religious ties had incurred, observing that there was no 
expenditure of “public money” within article XIII, section 2.114  In 
Americans United Incorporated as Protestants and Other Americans United 
 
 112. See Wendtland, supra note 107, at 653 (concluding that Supreme Court’s 
“shift from strong disapproval of church-state entanglement to a relative 
accommodation has left considerable room for the states to maintain a wall of 
separation through their own constitutions”). 
 113. See id. (“[S]tate courts consult federal [Establishment Clause] precedent 
while creating independent tests that promote particular state constitutional 
values.”). 
 114. 232 N.W.2d 106, 112, 305 Minn. 97, 107 (1975). The court noted that 
among the three colleges, only Bethel College was owned and operated by a 
church body (the Baptist General Conference) and that the only religious ties to 
the other institutions, St. Mary’s College and the College of St. Theresa, involved 
requirements that one-third of the colleges’ boards of trustees be from certain 
religious orders.  Id. at 108 nn. 9-11, 305 Minn. at 100 nn. 9-11.  Refinancing was 
described as aid of a “very special sort” that resulted in no “financial burden” to 
the state and “no grant or appropriation of public money nor a loan of public 
credit.  Id. at 111-12, 305 Minn. at 105-06 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 745 
n.7 (1973); Cal. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513, 521 (Cal. 1974); 
Opinion of the Justices, 236 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1968)). 
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for Separation of Church and State v. Independent School District No. 622, 
the court held that using public money to transport children to 
sectarian schools was on “the verge of unconstitutionality,” but was 
permissible because busing does not “directly involve support of the 
educational process” within article XIII, section 2’s prohibition 
against “support” for religious schools.115  The court held that 
public busing “serves a legitimate secular purpose in promoting the 
safety and welfare of children required to attend school under our 
compulsory attendance law,” and that any benefits to religion were 
“purely incidental and inconsequential.”116 
In 1993, the Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted Americans 
United as permitting “indirect and incidental” benefits to religious 
schools, holding that a church-affiliated college could be 
reimbursed from public funds for courses that high school students 
took as part of the Post-Secondary Enrollment Options Act.117  Four 
years later, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Americans 
United and the state court of appeals case to decide as a “matter of 
law” that an arrangement between a school district and a member 
of a religious order did not violate article I, section 16 or article 
XIII, section 2. 118  The church member had purchased a school 
building and sought to have a school district “lease space” there 
and operate a public school, on condition that the school district 
provide a teacher and, in accordance with the religious order’s 
teachings, not use electronics, including computers.   A divided 
Eighth Circuit held that the arrangement did not violate the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, and then affirmed 
constitutionality under the state constitution.119  The Eighth Circuit 
observed that although the “[Minnesota] establishment clauses 
prohibit both ‘benefits’ and ‘support’ to schools teaching 
distinctive religious doctrines,” the arrangement was proper 
 
 115. 179 N.W.2d 146, 155-56, 288 Minn. 196, 213-15 (1970).  At the time, the 
relevant state constitutional language was numbered as article VIII, section 2. 
 116. Id. at 156, 288 Minn. at 214. 
 117. Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Mammenga, 500 N.W.2d 136, 138-39 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1993) (examining constitutionality of section 123.3514 of Minnesota 
Statutes (1990)). 
 118. Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068, 1077 (8th Cir. 1997).  
The federal appeals court found authority for ruling on the state constitutional 
claim in Hutchins v. Champion Int’l Corp., 110 F.3d 1341, 1345 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(citing Talley v. U.S. Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1983)).  Cf. Minn. 
Term Limits Coal. v. Keefe, 535 N.W.2d 306, 307 (Minn. 1995) (federal district 
court certified state constitutional question to Minnesota Supreme Court). 
 119. Stark, 123 F.3d at 1077. 
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because no religious instruction took place at the school “and there 
is no expenditure of public funds in support of the teaching or 
promulgating of religious beliefs.”120 
These cases strongly suggest that courts weighing state 
establishment-of-religion claims will strive to not hinder education.  
But a fifty-year-old case warns schools not to be lackadaisical.  In 
Independent School District No. 6 v. Johnson, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court found a “probable” violation of the article XIII, section 2 
language when the school failed to remove crucifixes, religious 
pictures, and holy water fonts from leased school space, but held 
that withholding state funding was improper because the State had 
failed to follow procedures for doing so.121 
The constitutionality of providing tax credits or deductions for 
parents who choose private education for their minor children—to 
the indirect benefit of parochial schools—is unresolved under 
article I, section 16 or article XIII, section 2.122  This is not so in 
Wisconsin, where the state supreme court examined language 
substantially similar to article I, section 16 in upholding a state law 
permitting some Milwaukee children to attend any private school at 
public expense.123  In holding that the law did not violate the state 
constitutional provision that prohibits public funds from being 
used “for the benefit of” religious societies or seminaries, the court 
distinguished precedent from 1962 that the state constitution 
provided a “stricter standard” than the First Amendment, 
determined that “well reasoned” federal cases controlled the state 
constitutional inquiry, and concluded that the state law’s “primary 
effect” was not to advance religion.124  The court then used only 
state precedent to further conclude that the law did not violate the 
state constitutional provision against “compelled” attendance at 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. 65 N.W.2d 668, 669, 673-74, 242 Minn. 539, 540-41, 547-48 (1954). 
 122. In Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that a statute providing tax credits for Minnesota parents who send their 
children to “nonpublic schools” violated the Establishment Clause, and further 
held that it “need not consider questions raised under the Minnesota 
Constitution[.]”  224 N.W.2d 344, 353, 302 Minn. 216, 233 (1974).  Then the 
United States Supreme Court held in Mueller v. Allen that a Minnesota law 
permitting parents to deduct elementary and secondary education expenses, 
including those paid to parochial schools, did not offend the Establishment Clause 
because the benefit was available to all parents.  463 U.S. 388, 388, 397 (1983).   
 123. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998). 
 124. Id. at 620-22 (distinguishing Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 
1962)). 
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places of worship.125 
IV. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
A. Standard Develops in Minnesota Supreme Court 
Few tenets are more engrained in the United States than the 
idea that persons may exercise their religious beliefs as they wish.  
The ethos often is linked to colonists’ desire to escape England’s 
“religious strife and intolerance.”126  But as Michael McConnell 
observes, once in America the colonists exercised religiousness in 
various ways—with intolerant Puritanism, with a desire to govern by 
using religious principles, with “benign neglect” for established 
churches and “de facto religious toleration,” and with desire to 
accommodate religious dissenters.127  New York, from which 
Minnesota imported its freedom of conscience provision, 
subscribed to the “benign neglect” model, “largely due to the 
extraordinary religious diversity of the area.”128 
As mentioned previously, strict scrutiny remains the standard 
in Minnesota for determining whether a law burdens free exercise 
of religion.129  Under article I, section 16, after a person proves that 
a sincerely held religious belief is excessively burdened, the state 
must prove that the measure is the least restrictive means for 
serving the overriding or compelling government interest.130  The 
standard most often is associated with State v. Hershberger, a case in 
which Amish buggy drivers sought exemption from a traffic law 
requiring slow-moving-vehicle signs to be displayed.131  However, 
ten weeks before Hershberger the Minnesota Supreme Court issued 
an often-overlooked plurality decision in State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 
which suggests to practitioners that morality sometimes is more 
important than precedent when state-constitutional standards are 
developed.132  Two years after Hershberger and Cooper came Hill-
Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill Murray High School, which 
 
 125. Id. at 622-23 (citing Holt v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1975)). 
 126. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1421. 
 127. Id. at 1422-24. 
 128. Id. at 1424; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
 130. Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 
865 (Minn. 1992); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990). 
 131. 462 N.W.2d at 395. 
 132. See State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-11 (Minn. 1990). 
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solidified the strict scrutiny rule and provided clear guidance on 
how to maintain or defend against a free-exercise case under the 
state constitution.133 
1. State ex rel. Cooper v. French 
In State ex rel. Cooper v. French, a landlord argued that his 
religious rights would be violated if he was forced under the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act to rent an apartment to an 
unmarried woman likely to cohabitate with her fiancé.134  A four-
justice majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the 
landlord, reasoning that the legislature did not intend for the 
Human Rights Act to protect “unmarried, cohabitating couples in 
housing cases,” particularly amid the state’s “longstanding” distaste 
for fornication.135 
Three of the four justices then decided that article I, section 
16 “commands this court to weigh the competing interests at stake 
whenever rights of conscience are burdened”136—an inquiry that 
Justice John E. Simonett considered unnecessary given the case’s 
disposition on statutory grounds.137  The plurality concluded that 
article I, section 16 prevented the marriage-based Human Rights 
Act provision from being applied to landlord French.138  Without 
citing supporting authority, the plurality observed that article I, 
section 16 “grants far more protection of religious freedom than 
the broad language of the United States Constitution.”139  The 
plurality proposed a strict scrutiny test for laws that burden religion 
and concluded that the State had failed to prove that ensuring 
housing for unmarried women likely to have sex with a significant 
 
 133. 487 N.W.2d at 864-67. 
 134. 460 N.W.2d at 4 (referencing section 363.03, subdivision 2(1)(a) of 
Minnesota Statutes (1986)).  Landlord French was renting out a two-bedroom 
house, which apparently had served as his homestead, until he could sell it.  Id. at 
3. 
 135. Id. at 5, 7 (apparently referencing section 609.34 of Minnesota Statutes, 
still in effect today, which criminalizes sexual intercourse between “any man” and 
a “single woman”).  The court observed:  “How can there be a compelling state 
interest in promoting fornication when there is a state statute on the books 
prohibiting it? . . . Rather than grant French an exemption from the MHRA, the 
state would rather grant everyone an exemption from the fornication statute.  
Such a result is absurd.”  Id. at 10. 
 136. Id. at 9. 
 137. Id. at 11. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 9. 
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other was a “sufficiently compelling interest.”140 
Chief Justice Peter S. Popovich dissented, joined by Justices 
Rosalie E. Wahl and Alexander M. (Sandy) Keith.  Chief Justice 
Popovich contended the case was controlled by State ex rel. McClure 
v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., where in 1985 the court had applied 
both the First Amendment and article I, section 16 to hold that 
health-club operators who sought to employ only fundamentalist 
Christians violated the Human Rights Act.141  He argued against 
ignoring the First Amendment and observed, “the majority’s 
attempt to interpret the Minnesota Constitution’s Freedom of 
Conscience provision more broadly is not supported by a single 
decision of this court.”142 
2. State v. Hershberger 
Seventy days after deciding French, the court issued its 
landmark Hershberger opinion.  Again, the case’s evolution provides 
valuable insight into how state constitutional cases can develop.  
Initially, the court had exempted the Amish buggy drivers from the 
state traffic law solely under the First Amendment’s then-valid strict 
scrutiny test, saving article I, section 16 analysis “for another day.”143  
Then the United States Supreme Court remanded Hershberger in 
light of Employment Division v. Smith, which, as discussed above, 
largely eviscerated the strict scrutiny standard.144 
On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly observed 
that Smith had “significantly changed first amendment free exercise 
analysis” and then examined the Amish’s case under article I, 
section 16.145  The court held that the buggy drivers already had 
proven that their beliefs were sincere under the recently overruled 
Sherbert test.146  The question was whether the State had 
demonstrated “that public safety cannot be achieved through 
reasonable alternative means” other than requiring slow-moving-
 
 140. Id. at 10. 
 141. Id. at 14-15, 21 (referencing State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 
Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985)). 
 142. Id. at 14. 
 143. State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Minn. 1989). 
 144. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990) (vacating State v. 
Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989)); see also supra notes 43-45 and 
accompanying text. 
 145. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-99 (Minn. 1990). 
 146. Id. at 396; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963) 
(requiring plaintiff to prove “substantial” burden). 
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vehicle signs.147  The court concluded that because lanterns and 
reflective tape would adequately protect Amish buggies, the State 
had not met its burden under article I, section 16, and for the first 
time a majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from 
the First Amendment to decide a free exercise claim solely under 
the Minnesota Constitution.148 
The author was none other than Chief Justice Popovich, who 
just ten weeks earlier had criticized the French plurality for citing no 
precedent while ignoring the First Amendment.  In Hershberger, 
Popovich cited the 1984 article that Judge Nordby co-authored, the 
French plurality’s opinion, and Sports & Health Club to hold that 
under article I, section 16, the State bears the burden of proving 
that it is employing the least restrictive means to fulfill a compelling 
interest.149 
3. Hill-Murray 
In Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School 
the issue was whether the Minnesota Labor Relations Act could be 
applied to a Catholic high school where lay employees sought 
union representation.150  The court again disavowed the United 
States Supreme Court’s “limited analysis” on free exercise claims 
and declared that Minnesota courts shall “retain the compelling 
state interest balancing test.”151  Article I, section 16 was said to have 
four prongs: “whether the objector’s belief is sincerely held; 
whether the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious 
beliefs; whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding or 
compelling; and whether the state regulation uses the least 
restrictive means.”152 
The court had little trouble finding a sincerely held belief, and 
under the third prong found an overriding and compelling state 
interest in maintaining peace during labor relations.153 As for the 
second prong, the court acknowledged that the school had shown 
that the law interfered “with their authority as an employer,” but 
 
 147. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 399. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 397-99. 
 150. Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 
(Minn. 1992). 
 151. Id. at 865. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 865, 867. 
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faulted the school for not demonstrating that “this minimal 
interference excessively burdens their religious beliefs.”154  Under the 
fourth prong, the court held that the school’s proffered voluntary 
grievance procedure, while a less-restrictive means, was inadequate 
because it was “just that—voluntary.”155  Therefore, balancing all 
four prongs, the court determined that applying the Labor 
Relations Act to the Catholic high school did not offend article I, 
section 16. 
B. Standard Applied in Minnesota Court of Appeals 
Because it has confronted all four prongs of the Hershberger-
Hill-Murray test, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has provided 
practitioners and district courts with pragmatic, facts-specific 
guidance on how state free-exercise claims should be addressed.  
Further guidance is likely as Minnesota courts adjudicate whether 
the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act—the so-called 
“conceal and carry” law that prevents employers, including 
churches, from banning firearms from their parking lots—is 
constitutional.156 
As for when a religious belief is sincere, the court of appeals 
held that conditioning an unapologetic sex offender’s probation 
on him admitting the crime does not violate article I, section 16 
because telling the truth is “more of a pragmatic, cost-benefit 
principle than anything else.”157  The court has also held that 
prohibiting medicinal use of marijuana infringes a “personal” 
medical need and not a sincerely held religious belief, even though 
 
 154. Id. at 866 (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. at 867. 
 156. See Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 597, 600 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding that the act violated the “single-subject requirement” of 
article IV, section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution, but declining to review the 
article I, section 16 claim “on an advisory basis”).  The district court had addressed 
the case’s merits, ruling that the plaintiff churches that seek to exclude firearms 
from their parking lots had met their burden under article I, section 16, and that 
the State had failed to identify a compelling interest or to address less-restrictive 
alternatives.  Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, No. C9-03-9570, 2004 WL 1630505, 
at *9-11 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. July 14, 2004).  A similar action is pending in 
Hennepin County District Court.  See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 673 
N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, No. 
MC 03-008185, 2004 WL 632766 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. March 16, 2004); see 
also Margaret Zack, Lawsuit Over Conceal-Carry Takes on Guns at Church, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Aug. 2, 2005, at 1B. 
 157. State v. Schwartz, 598 N.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
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the Book of Genesis directs that “God gives us every plant bearing 
seeds inside itself for our consumption and for our health.”158  
Forbidding a criminal defendant from wearing a cross during trial 
might impinge a sincerely held religious belief, but failing to hold a 
hearing on the issue does not create an error necessitating a new 
trial.159 
Twice the court of appeals has held that the Christ’s 
Household of Faith church requirement that members work full 
time for the church is a sincerely held religious belief.160  Requiring 
a restaurateur to deliver food inside a facility where abortions are 
performed infringes on the “moral conscience” and therefore 
impinges on a sincerely held religious belief.161  Mandatory 
standardized school testing was held to infringe on sincerely held 
religious views of parents who believe that sending their children to 
public schools would risk the parents’ “eternal damnation” and 
sending them to parochial schools would interfere with a “personal 
relationship” with God.162 
As for when beliefs are burdened, the Christ’s Household of 
Faith cases suggest that an individual’s right to believe is superior to 
a church’s right to maintain an autonomous forum for those 
beliefs.  Both cases involved fathers ordered to pay child support—
one through a court order that named the father, the other 
through mandatory withholding from the Christ’s Household of 
Faith church, which was the father’s employer.163  In the first case, 
the court held that the father’s beliefs were burdened by forcing him 
to take a job outside the church to pay a child-support obligation, 
but in the second case the court held that requiring the church to 
withhold child support from the father’s earnings was permissible 
because it was indistinguishable from requiring the church to issue 
tax forms and did not force the church to “change its religious 
conduct or philosophy.”164 
As for the third prong, the court of appeals has held that 
 
 158. State v. Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d 368, 371-72, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(quoting Genesis 1:11-12, 29; 9:3). 
 159. State v. Tate, 682 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 160. Rooney v. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d 362, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Murphy v. 
Murphy, 574 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that appellant had 
been a church member for two decades, had married in the church, and worked 
forty hours a week for the church). 
 161. Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 162. In re Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d 88, 90, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
 163. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d at 369; Murphy, 574 N.W.2d at 81. 
 164. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d at 369-70; Murphy, 574 N.W.2d at 81. 
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education165 and ensuring parental child support were compelling 
government interests,166 but that enforcing a civil rights ordinance 
against an anti-abortion restaurateur was not.167 
On the fourth prong—when burdening sincerely held 
religious beliefs is found to be the least restrictive way to satisfy the 
government interest—the court of appeals encourages government 
to at least try some other step before undertaking the potentially 
infringing activity.  In Rooney v. Rooney, the child-support 
withholding case, the court noted that the county’s other efforts, 
including revoking the father’s driver’s license and garnishing 
wages of other employers, had failed.168  However, in Murphy v. 
Murphy, the other child-support case, the court held that it could 
not determine whether the least-restrictive means were used 
because the record lacked information on how much work the 
father could do outside the church without infringing on his 
religious obligations.169  Likewise, in the standardized testing case, 
the court of appeals criticized the district court for removing 
children from the home before exhausting “additional statutory 
remedies . . . .”170 
C. The Standard Summarized 
The Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases 
suggest that when assessing a law under article I, section 16’s four-
prong inquiry, a Minnesota court will perform a fact-intensive 
balancing test and will not rigidly apply standards as to burdens of 
production and proof.  Individuals such as the anti-abortion 
restaurateur and distinct minority groups such as the Amish seem 
to be held to something less than the “excessive” burden to beliefs 
that Hill-Murray High School had to prove.  Courts appear less 
likely to compel behavior (i.e., displaying a slow-moving vehicle sign, 
renting an apartment, delivering food, testing children) than to 
prevent behavior (i.e., using marijuana, displaying a cross during 
trial).  In addition, when a generally applicable law is at issue, 
individual plaintiffs such as small-business people or fathers curry 
courts’ favor better than groups such as Catholic high schools. 
 
 165. Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d at 92. 
 166. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d at 370; Murphy, 574 N.W.2d at 81-82. 
 167. Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 168. 669 N.W.2d at 370-71. 
 169. 574 N.W.2d at 82. 
 170. In re Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d at 93. 
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And, for good or for bad, it appears that free exercise claims 
arising under article I, section 16 remain fact-specific and 
susceptible to moral judgments: 171  marijuana, sex before marriage, 
and abortion are bad; the Amish way of life is admirable; and 
children and labor relations are more important than “minimal 
interference” with church doctrine. 
D. Jurisdiction and Standing 
Minnesota’s appellate courts employ article I, section 16 apart 
from the substantive free-exercise context to determine whether a 
court has subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate civil actions 
against churches.  Burdens of proof yield to an appellate court’s de 
novo review, consistent with the general rule that subject matter 
jurisdiction may be challenged at any time and even on the 
appellate court’s own motion.172  Accordingly, when a church or 
church official is a party in a Minnesota state court, litigants should 
be poised to adjudicate procedural questions involving jurisdiction 
and standing under article I, section 16. 
The leading case is Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, decided in 2002, where a minister, sued after having 
romantic relations with a parishioner-counselee, contended that 
enforcing a negligence claim would violate his state constitutional 
rights.173  The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a 
statute regulating unlicensed mental health professionals merely 
provided a “floor of acceptable conduct” that fails to burden 
religious practice, that the State’s interest in protecting against the 
“frequently vulnerable nature” of counselees was compelling, and 
 
 171. As the Minnesota Supreme Court observed in French: 
There are certain moral values and institutions that have served western 
civilizations for eons.  This generation does not have a monopoly on 
either knowledge or wisdom.  Before abandoning fundamental values 
and institutions, we must pause and take stock of our present social 
order: millions of drug abusers; rampant child abuse; a rising underclass 
without marketable job skills; children roaming the streets; children with 
only one parent or no parent at all; and children with no one to guide 
them in developing any set of values.  How can we expect anything else 
when the state contributes, by arguments of this kind, to further erosion 
of fundamental institutions that have formed the foundation of our 
civilizations for centuries? 
State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10-11 (Minn. 1990). 
 172. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982). 
 173. 649 N.W.2d 426, 443 (Minn. 2002). 
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that the statute did not regulate any “spiritual advice or guidance” 
and therefore was “tailored in a non-restrictive manner.”174  In a 
similar case in 2003, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 
article I, section 16 did not deprive a court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction to determine whether an employment relationship 
existed between a pastor and his church’s governing body.175 
Three other court of appeals cases from 1995 remain relevant.  
In Lundman v. McKown, which involved the death of a child treated 
by Christian Science practitioners, the court held that awarding 
compensatory damages did not violate article I, section 16 because 
the damages were not a “vehicle for attacking religious belief” and 
were more effective at furthering the state’s compelling interest in 
protecting children than measures such as criminally prosecuting 
Christian Scientist custodial parents.176  But jurisdiction was denied 
under article I, section 16 in the other 1995 cases.  In Geraci v. 
Eckankar, the court held that adjudicating an employment-
termination claim from an Eckankar church employee who became 
ineligible for church membership “would require a court to 
question Eckankar’s monitoring of Geraci’s adherence to church 
doctrine, its reasons for excommunication, and the veracity of 
Eckankar’s responses.”177  In Basich v. Board of Pensions, Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America, the court denied jurisdiction in a 
breach-of-contract claim from pastors who challenged a pension 
plan’s divestment from companies doing business in South Africa, 
 
 174. Id. at 442-43.  Subsequently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the 
Minnesota Constitution did not bar jurisdiction against the Minnesota Conference 
of Seventh-Day Adventists for negligent employment and vicarious liability.  
Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 657 N.W.2d 569, 576 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 175. Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 262 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003).  The court also affirmed jurisdiction for a vicarious liability claim because 
there was no showing of “how an examination by the court of whether sexual 
penetration occurred within the scope of employment involves any inquiry into 
church doctrine or procedure . . . .”  Id. at 264. 
 176. 530 N.W.2d 807, 818-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 31, 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1092 (1996). 
 177. 526 N.W.2d 391, 395, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 
14, 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995).  But in 1991, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held that subjecting a Lutheran church to a terminated pastor’s sexual 
harassment claim under the Human Rights Act presented no burden to church 
practices “in light of the church’s own policy against such conduct.”  Black v. 
Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).  “Even if this regulation 
would incidentally burden religious activity or belief, [the pastor] is entitled to 
assert this claim because the state’s interest in eradicating sexual harassment in the 
work place is compelling . . . .”  Id. 
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finding an article I, section 16 violation because the lawsuit 
involved “social or moral investment strategies” and because there 
was no compelling interest in solving the dispute.178 
Recently, the court of appeals employed article I, section 16 to 
examine a plaintiff church’s standing to sue over Minnesota’s 
“conceal and carry” law.179  In affirming standing, the court 
preliminarily reviewed the claim’s merits, concluding that “[i]t 
would be disingenuous for us to deny the existence of a justiciable 
controversy where appellants have raised an arguably viable 
challenge to free exercise.”180 
These cases signal that article I, section 16 permits Minnesota 
courts to adjudicate disputes involving churches as long as neutral 
legal principles may be applied without judicial intrusion into 
church doctrine.181  Burden of proof appears to be a non-issue: 
Courts are to weigh all relevant factors at any stage of the litigation 
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction or standing are 
present.  In addition, once a compelling governmental interest is 
found, it seems that something other than strict scrutiny is applied 
for determining whether judicial enforcement is the least-restrictive 
option.182 
V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
A. A Speech-Hostile Minnesota 
During times of peace and even of war, “Americans 
consistently have testified to the underlying value of free speech.”183  
Minnesotans, for their part, frequently position themselves “in the 
 
 178. 540 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810 (1996). 
 179. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 673 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 180. Id. at 523. 
 181. See also Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 
(1976) (holding that “hierarchical religious organizations” may establish rules and 
tribunals for “internal discipline and government” to which civil courts must defer 
under the First Amendment). 
 182. In Odenthal, for instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the 
statute regulating unlicensed counselors was “tailored in a non-restrictive 
manner”—hardly language confirming that the least-restrictive means was 
employed.  Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 
426, 443 (Minn. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 183. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 13 (1997). 
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forefront for protection of public debate.”184  For example, after 
more than 400 St. Paul Pioneer Press readers responded to an 
informal survey about free speech in 2005, the opinion page editor 
wrote a column headlined First Amendment Alive, Well Here to 
distinguish Minnesota as being outside a national trend of hostility 
toward free speech.185  Article I, section 3 of the Minnesota 
Constitution, which affirms that “all persons may freely speak, write 
and publish their sentiments on all subjects” and declares that the 
press “shall forever remain inviolate,” seems to confirm 
Minnesota’s prominence as a place of speech tolerance.186 
However, article I, section 3 also specifies that speakers are 
“responsible for the abuse” from exercising their rights, and 
Minnesota historically has led the nation not just in punishing 
speech but in restraining it under state law.187  In 1907, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court cited article I, section 3 while holding 
that the Pioneer Press could be convicted for violating a state law 
barring newspapers from publishing specific details of executions—
details, according to the court, that were likely to have “an 
unwholesome effect on the public mind.”188  Eight years later, the 
court did not even mention article I, section 3 when affirming the 
Minneapolis mayor’s discretion to revoke a movie-theater license.189  
Professor William Anderson, in his 1921 treatise A History of the 
Constitution of Minnesota, observed that it was appropriate to control 
and punish speech when government faced “certain emergencies” 
such as war.190  In his 1941 treatise Free Speech in the United States, 
Zechariah Chafee Jr. observed that no state eclipsed Minnesota’s 
use of state law to punish antiwar speech during and after World 
War I even though “not a single person was dissuaded from 
enlisting.”191 
 
 184. Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1991). 
 185. Art Coulson, First Amendment Alive, Well Here, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 
13, 2005, at 10B. 
 186. MINN. CONST. art. I. § 3. 
 187. Id. 
 188. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 110 N.W. 867, 868, 100 Minn. 173, 175 (1907). 
 189. Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 154 N.W. 964, 965-66, 195 Minn. 195, 
198-99 (1915). 
 190. ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 159. 
 191. ZECHARAIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 100-01, 287-88 
(1941).  Chafee observed that the Minnesota Reports contain eighteen World War 
I criminal prosecutions of persons charged with making speech that had a “natural 
and reasonable effect” of urging against military service, even though “not a single 
person was dissuaded from enlisting, and even though the jury found and believed 
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Minnesota cases prompted the United States Supreme Court 
to extend the First Amendment’s speech clause to the states.  In 
Gilbert v. Minnesota, in which the Court affirmed a World War I 
pacifist’s conviction under Minnesota law for making speech with a 
“natural and reasonable effect” to dissuade military enlistment, 
Justice Louis Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion, became first on 
the Court to write that the First Amendment applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.192  Eleven years later came 
Near v. Minnesota, where the Supreme Court derailed Minnesota’s 
effort to “wage war on the yellow press” and, in so doing, for the 
first time invalidated a state law under the First Amendment.193 
 
that the speaker had not the slightest intention of hindering enlistment or any 
other war service.”  Id. at 287-88. 
One would have supposed that the federal Espionage Act was a sufficient 
safeguard against opposition to the war, but many states were not 
satisfied with either its terms or its enforcement, and enacted similar but 
more drastic laws of their own . . . .  The most important of these statutes, 
that of Minnesota, made it unlawful to say “that men should not enlist in 
the military or naval forces of the United States or the State of 
Minnesota,” or that residents of that state should not aid the United 
States in carrying on war with the public enemies. 
Id. at 100-01.  Chafee concluded that Minnesota was ripe for antiwar speech 
because of the “large number of farmers of German birth,” and the general rural 
agrarian antagonism toward urban interests that stood to benefit from World War 
I.  Id. at 288. 
 192. State v. Gilbert, 169 N.W. 790, 791, 141 Minn. 263, 265 (1918), aff’d sub 
nom. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).  In dissent, Justice Brandeis wrote: 
As the Minnesota statute is in my opinion invalid because it interferes 
with federal functions and with the right of a citizen of the United States 
to discuss them, I see no occasion to consider whether it violates also the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But I have difficulty in believing that the liberty 
guaranteed by the Constitution, which has been held to protect against 
state denial the right of an employer to discriminate against a workman 
because he is a member of a trade union, the right of a business man to 
conduct a private employment agency, or to contract outside the state for 
insurance of his property, although the Legislature deems it inimical to 
the public welfare, does not include liberty to teach, either in the privacy 
of the home or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism; so long, at least, as 
Congress has not declared that the public safety demands its suppression.  
I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property. 
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted).  Brandeis’s dissent “was the first glimmer of the new day which was to 
dawn” five years later as the First Amendment speech clause was extended to the 
states. CHAFEE, supra note 191, at 297. 
 193. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931).  Six years 
earlier, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), the Court had upheld New 
York state’s “criminal anarchy” statute and observed that “[f]or present purposes 
we may and do assume” that the First Amendment applied to the states.  But 
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In both Gilbert and Near, the Minnesota Supreme Court had 
held that article I, section 3 did not protect the speech.194  The 
court observed that the pacifist’s words ran counter to “our 
purpose in the war” and the idea “that the world must be made safe 
for democracy,”195 and that article I, section 3 was reserved only for 
newspapers that “publish the truth with impunity, with good 
motives, and for justifiable ends.”196  As the court said in State v. 
Guilford, the precursor to Near: 
[O]ur Constitution was never intended to protect malice, 
scandal and defamation when untrue or published with 
bad motive or without justifiable ends.  It is a shield for 
the honest, careful and conscientious press.  Liberty of the 
press does not mean that an evilminded person may 
publish just anything any more than the constitutional 
right of free assembly authorizes and legalizes unlawful 
assemblies and riots. . . .  [T]he Legislature is authorized 
to make laws to bridle the appetites of those who thrive 
upon scandal and rejoice in its consequences.197 
Article I, section 3 must be examined against this backdrop—
in which the Minnesota Constitution was used not just to punish 
speech but also to restrict it before it could be punished.  This 
perspective helps gauge how Minnesota courts have resolved state 
constitutional cases involving speech. 
B. Protest Speech and Framework for Analysis 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s most recent application of 
article I, section 3 is in State v. Wicklund,198 the Mall of America 
protest case.199  The holding is that when protesters’ speech 
 
because the speaker lost, the sentence sometimes is considered dictum such that 
Near may be credited with incorporating the First Amendment through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Nadine Strossen, Frontiers of Legal Thought II, The New 
First Amendment: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 484, 565 n.411 (1990) (characterizing Gitlow’s incorporation language as 
dictum). 
 194. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 772, 174 Minn. 457, 463; 
State v. Gilbert, 169 N.W. at 792, 141 Minn. at 267. 
 195. Gilbert, 169 N.W. at 791, 141 Minn. at 265. 
 196. Guilford, 219 N.W. at 771-72, 174 Minn. at 459, 462. 
 197. Id. at 772, 174 Minn. at 463.  There is no Minnesota constitutional right to 
free assembly.  See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 198. 589 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Minn. 1999). 
 199. Id.; see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding no First 
Amendment right to enter a shopping center to advertise a strike). 
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interests are balanced against private property interests under the 
state constitution, the property owners win, particularly when the 
speakers’ goal is provocation and not furthering a political end:200 
Appellants’ speech was directed at persuading shoppers to 
forgo buying fur products and to boycott Macy’s in an 
attempt to effect change in the retail and fur industries.  
Its purpose was not to achieve some political goal such as 
a ballot initiative—it is best characterized as protest 
speech, intended to be provocative.  We decline to extend 
the free speech protections of Article I, Section 3 of the 
Minnesota Constitution beyond those protections offered 
by the First Amendment.201 
This primacy of property rights is bolstered by State v. Olson,202 
where in 1970 the court invoked article I, section 3 as well as the 
First Amendment to uphold the disturbing-the-peace conviction of 
a protester who intended to “create a dialogue” at a Minneapolis 
Catholic church during Mass by accusing the priest of “hypocrisy” 
in a “loud and angry tone.”203  Neither the state nor federal 
constitution, according to the court, prohibited criminal sanctions 
to curb “insulting remarks and bizarre behavior.”204 
Besides providing a relevant balancing test, Wicklund also 
suggests to practitioners a framework, open to criticism, that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court might follow when examining speech 
claims under the state constitution.205  As mentioned previously, the 
court identified its “first consideration” not as what the plain 
language of article I, section 3 said, but as what the Minnesota 
Constitution’s framers intended by drafting the provision more 
broadly than the First Amendment.206  Finding no intent to depart, 
the “next question” for the court was whether there was “sound 
reason” for departing from the federal standard.207  The court 
found no reason to depart, distinguishing decisions in which the 
court had extended state constitutional rights to privacy and to 
counsel, as well as article I, section 3 cases involving commercial 
 
 200. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 798-99, 801. 
 201. Id. at 801. 
 202. 178 N.W.2d 230, 231, 287 Minn. 300, 301 (1970). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 232, 287 Minn. at 304. 
 205. 589 N.W.2d at 794-95. 
 206. Id. at 798-99; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
 207. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 799. 
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speech, obscenity, and freedom of the press.208 
Next, after observing that most states apply their speech 
provisions no differently than the First Amendment, the court 
confronted speech in shopping malls and observed that a “small 
minority” of states afford stronger protections under state 
constitutions but typically “under the cloak of another 
constitutional provision” related to the political process.209  Given 
that the Mall of America protesters intended to provoke instead of 
politick, the court denied them access to the mall under the 
Minnesota Constitution.210 
The court was correct that courts commonly do not affirm 
independent state constitutional protections for speech, including 
in shopping malls,211 and the court is not alone in ignoring the 
constitution’s plain language.212  But by distinguishing the fur 
protesters from those who might further a “political goal such as a 
ballot initiative,”213 one wonders whether the court might deviate 
from its Wicklund analysis by examining article I, section 3’s plain 
language and, under certain circumstances, side with persons 
seeking mall access for purely political purposes.214  Besides, few 
places other than Minnesota may boast of a public-private place 
quite like the Mall of America.215 
Although Minnesota’s World War I protest cases could have 
been dismissed as irrelevant just a few years ago, recent campaigns 
against global terrorism suggest that the cases should not be 
discarded.  Among the earliest and most illustrative is State v. 
Holm,216 where the Minnesota Supreme Court punished 
pamphleteers who characterized the war as “arbitrarily declared 
 
 208. Id. at 799-800. 
 209. Id. at 800-01 (citing Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 592 P.2d 341 
(Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 
N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. 
Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Whifen, 849 P.2d 446 
(Or. 1993)). 
 210. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801. 
 211. See, e.g., City of W. Des Moines v. Engler, 641 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 
2002); Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 843-44 (Wis. 1987). 
 212. See, e.g., supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
 213. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801. 
 214. See Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 849 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (observing that shopping-mall management “exercises an 
enormous power when it denies political speakers access to such a center of 
community life”). 
 215. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 216. 166 N.W. 181, 181, 139 Minn. 267, 271 (1918). 
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against the will of the people,” claimed that “the President and 
Congress have forced this war upon the United States[,]” and 
concluded that “the integrity of the country is being menaced” in 
favor of Wall Street interests.217  The defendants’ punishment 
appeared based both on article I, section 3 and the First 
Amendment, and the rationale was affirmed in several more 
cases.218  Eventually, laws such as Minnesota’s that punished speech 
based on bad tendencies or “natural” effects were struck down.219 
The future of punishing and preventing war-protest speech 
under state and federal constitutions is not clear given the nation’s 
ongoing response to the 2001 terrorist attacks.  As Professor David 
M. Rabban wrote in 1997, “when politics does not go well, and 
produces a Red Scare or a McCarthy Era or some other state 
enforcement of ‘political correctness,’ the right to free speech may 
serve important purposes for society as well as individuals.”220  But 
as First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh observed in 2005, 
“making fear of terrorism an ‘underlying theme of domestic and 
foreign policy’ is quite proper when terrorists are doing frightening 
things.”221 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id.; see also State v. Randall, 173 N.W. 425, 143 Minn. 203 (1919); State v. 
Gilbert, 169 N.W. 790, 141 Minn. 263 (1918); State v. Kaercher, 169 N.W. 699, 141 
Minn. 186 (1918); but see State v. Townley, 168 N.W. 591, 594, 140 Minn. 413, 423 
(1918) (holding that speech did not violate the statute because it was “nothing 
more serious than a rhetorical, and somewhat flamboyant, platform”). 
 219. A year after Holm, in 1919, the United States Supreme Court held in 
Schenck v. United States that speech that presents a “clear and present danger” to 
wartime interests may be restrained by the federal Espionage Act.  249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919).  Six years later, in Gitlow v. New York, the Court upheld New York state’s 
“criminal anarchy” statute that criminalized speech that “advocates, advises or 
teaches” overthrow of the government.  268 U.S. 625, 626 (1925).  Arguably, this 
decision invalidated broad laws such as Minnesota’s that examined speech for bad 
tendencies or “natural” effects.  The “clear and present danger” test resurfaced 
after the United States entered World War II when the Smith Act criminalized 
speech (by Communists) that advocated the government’s overthrow.  Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).  The final Smith Act conviction was affirmed in 
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).  Deference to the government’s 
determination of what constitutes danger eroded during the Vietnam War, 
evidenced by the Court’s refusal in the “Pentagon Papers” case to bar newspapers 
from publishing classified war details.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713 (1971). 
 220. RABBAN, supra note 183, at 393.  However, “[s]ubstantial doubts can more 
generally be raised as to whether any constitutional standard, however protective 
its language, can safeguard free speech in times of crisis.”  Id. at 379. 
 221. Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is It “McCarthyism”? When Is It 
Proper, 93 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005); see also Carpenter, supra note 38, at 
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C. Prior Restraint 
When government prohibits speech, it commits prior 
restraint—“the most serious and the least tolerable infringement 
on First Amendment rights.”222  Given the interstate and 
international natures of communication, it seems imprudent to 
decide prior restraint cases solely under state constitutional law.  
Nevertheless, cases decided under article I, section 3 reveal a 
sobering willingness among the Minnesota judiciary to restrain the 
news media from disseminating information simply because 
legislators considered it injurious. 
In State v. Pioneer Press Co.,223 the ninety-eight-year-old case 
upholding a state statute forbidding newspapers from detailing 
public executions, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged 
that article I, section 3 was “directly aimed at the removal of 
previous restraints upon public speech and freedom of the press,” 
but that “it does not follow that there is a constitutional right to 
publish every fact or statement which may be true.”224  The court 
deemed it permissible to report an execution’s occurrence but 
impermissible to describe the prisoner’s transport to the scaffold, 
his last statement, his noose and “black cap,” and, after the 
“springing of the trap,” the body’s removal.225  The supreme court 
gave remarkable deference to the legislature’s effort to “surround 
the execution of criminals with as much secrecy as possible, in 
order to avoid exciting an unwholesome effect on the public 
mind.” 226 
Pioneer Press was cited for support twenty-one years later in State 
v. Guilford,227 the case that became Near v. Minnesota.228  Hennepin 
County prosecutor (and eventual governor) Floyd B. Olson wielded 
the Public Nuisance Law of 1925 to “wage war on the yellow press” 
 
625.  “In an emergency, where there will be no time or opportunity for counter-
speech to prevent some evil, the [speech-protective] antipaternalism principle will 
not stand in the way of government speech restrictions designed to avoid it.”  Id. 
 222. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 223. 110 N.W. 867, 868, 100 Minn. 173, 176 (1907). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 867, 100 Minn. at 174. 
 226. Id. at 868, 100 Minn. at 175.  “[I]f, in the opinion of the Legislature, it is 
detrimental to public morals to publish anything more than the mere fact that the 
execution has taken place, then, under the authorities and upon principle, the 
appellant was not deprived of any constitutional right in being so limited.”  Id. at 
868-69, 100 Minn. at 177. 
 227. 219 N.W. 770, 772, 174 Minn. 457, 461 (1928). 
 228. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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by enjoining publishers who “customarily” produce, publish, 
circulate, possess, or give away a newspaper deemed “malicious, 
scandalous and defamatory . . . .”229  Olson’s specific targets were 
Howard A. Guilford and Jay M. Near who, among other things, 
reported “links between gambling syndicates and the police,” and 
printed accusations of election fraud in their “sensational” weekly 
newspaper, the Saturday Press.230  A district judge enjoined the 
publishers and certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the 
question of the Public Nuisance Law’s constitutionality in light of 
article I, section 3’s directive that press liberty “shall forever remain 
inviolate.”231  Accordingly, the supreme court held that article I, 
section 3 protected only those who publish “with good motives, and 
for justifiable ends . . . .”232 
Between Pioneer Press and Guilford came Campbell v. Motion 
Picture Machine Operators’ Union of Minneapolis, where the Minnesota 
Supreme Court applied antitrust law to enjoin the weekly 
Minneapolis Labor Review, a union mouthpiece, from publishing 
statements claiming that a theater owner was unfair to organized 
labor.233  The court rejected the newspaper’s argument that the free 
speech right in “the Constitution”—presumably Minnesota’s—was 
infringed, explaining that the newspaper went beyond merely 
notifying the public of a controversy.234  The court likened the 
newspaper’s pro-union campaign to an intentional tort against 
property: “The right of free speech is abused when words become 
verbal acts, and are then as much subject to injunction as the use of 
any other force whereby property is wrongfully injured.”235 
 
 229. State v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 771, 174 Minn. 457, 458 (1928); FRED W. 
FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: CORRUPTION, YELLOW JOURNALISM, AND THE CASE THAT 
SAVED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 21, 50 (Univ. of Minn. 2003) (1981). 
 230. FRIENDLY, supra note 229, at 39. 
 231. Id. at 53. 
 232. Guilford, 219 N.W. at 772, 174 Minn. at 462.  A year later, Guilford and 
Near argued to the Minnesota Supreme Court that they were prevented from 
publishing “any kind of newspaper,” in violation of article I, section 3 and state 
and federal due process rights.  State v. Guilford, 228 N.W. 326, 326, 179 Minn. 40, 
41 (1929).  The court dismissed the claims, observing that the publishers still 
could operate a newspaper “in harmony with the public welfare.”  Id. 
 233. Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators’ Union of Minneapolis, 186 
N.W. 781, 781-82, 151 Minn. 220, 224, 226 (1922). 
 234. Id. at 785, 151 Minn. at 232. 
 235. Id. 
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D. Newsgathering 
Apart from the right to publish news is the right (or lack of a 
right) to gather news.  Given the cross-jurisdictional nature of 
newsgathering today, using state constitutions to ensure journalists’ 
rights might be imprudent.  Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has considered newsgathering cases in light of article I, 
section 3.236 
Journalists are subject to generally applicable laws.  The 
United States Supreme Court made this point clearly in Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co.,237 another case originating in Minnesota with 
eventual article I, section 3 undertones. The Court held that the 
First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the 
two Twin Cities daily newspapers that dishonored promises not to 
publish a confidential source’s name.238  In his majority opinion, 
Justice Byron R. White urged the Minnesota Supreme Court on 
remand to consider whether article I, section 3 barred such a suit.239  
In response, the state supreme court acknowledged that it “may, of 
course, construe our free speech provision to afford broader 
protection than the federal clause,”  but bowed to the First 
Amendment because the “full First Amendment implications” of 
reporter-source agreements remained unclear.240 
Four years later, in State v. Turner, the court again examined 
 
 236. See State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Minn. 1996); Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992); Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1977). 
 237. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 238. Id. at 669-70.  Star Tribune (Minneapolis) and Pioneer Press (St. Paul) 
reporters had agreed not to publish the name of a political source who provided 
damaging information about a rival candidate for Minnesota governor.  Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990).  Editors overruled the 
reporters after deciding that the attempted “smear” campaign was newsworthy.  Id. 
at 201.  The source, Dan Cohen, sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and 
breach of contract.  Id. at 202.  The applicability of promissory estoppel surfaced 
only during oral argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that 
applying promissory estoppel law would violate the First Amendment because it 
would chill political speech at the First Amendment’s core.  Id. at 204 n.5, 205.  
Cohen had no cause of action for defamation because the newspapers’ reports 
were true.  Id. at 202. 
 239. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672.  “The [Minnesota Supreme Court] opinion did 
not refer to freedom of the press under the Minnesota Constitution.  Perhaps 
defendants’ counsel, like New York’s media lawyers, believed only in the First 
Amendment.”  Linde, supra note 57, at 219. 
 240. Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391. 
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article I, section 3 protections for newsgatherers.241  At issue was 
whether a Pioneer Press photographer could resist a criminal 
defendant’s subpoena seeking the photographer’s testimony and 
unpublished photographs related to the defendant’s arrest, which 
the photographer had chronicled while riding with St. Paul police 
officers.242  In interpreting article I, section 3, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court again followed federal precedent to hold that it did 
“not see how requiring a news photographer to testify regarding 
events he personally witnessed during the pursuit and arrest of an 
alleged drug offender will infringe upon our state constitution’s 
guarantee of free speech and publication.”243 
The court has signaled that there might be a state 
constitutional right to gather news from criminal-case files.  In 
Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, the court noted the relevance 
of article I, section 3 as well as the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution to direct that 
newspapers were to receive access to court files from two high-
profile homicides.244  The court held that although court files may 
be restricted in a “rare or extraordinary case,” the petitioner 
seeking closure has the burden of establishing a “strong factual 
basis,” and the district court must make specific findings after 
considering “all alternatives to the exceptional remedy . . . .”245 
E. Adult Speech 
In State v. Davidson, a 1992 case in which the manager of an 
adult bookstore challenged his obscenity conviction under the state 
constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court again found “no 
reason to apply our constitution differently” than the First 
Amendment and without dissent affirmed the conviction under 
 
 241. 550 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1996). 
 242. Id. at 624-25. 
 243. Id. at 628-29.  But the court did order in camera review of the unpublished 
photographs to balance “the defendant’s need for evidence” against 
“overburdening the news media.”  Id. at 629. 
 244. 259 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1977).  The court files referred to the August 1977 
shooting death of Shirleen Howard in Winona and the arrest of her husband and 
the June 1977 death of Elizabeth Congdon and her nurse, Velma Pietila, in 
Duluth, and the arrest of Congdon’s son-in-law.  Id. at 255-56. 
 245. Id. at 257.  The court characterized the case as one of “prior restraint,” 
but the opinion does not suggest that the newspapers were barred from publishing 
information that they possessed.  Id.  Accordingly, the case is better characterized 
as one involving newsgathering. 
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article I, section 3.246  Essentially, the court held that although the 
state constitution ensures that persons may speak on all subjects, 
the fact that speakers may be “responsible for the abuse”—
including for peddling obscenity, which the court noted is 
unprotected by the First Amendment—is paramount.247 
Today, state constitutions may be of limited use in obscenity 
cases now that pornography typically is found not in local 
bookstores but on the global internet.  But for purely local “adult 
speech” such as nude dancing, article I, section 3 remains relevant 
and, judging by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s most-recent case 
on the subject, is ripe for reconsideration.248 
Knudtson v. City of Coates involved a municipality’s power to ban 
nude dancing in establishments with liquor licenses.249  Writing for 
a four justice-majority, Justice Simonett characterized nude 
dancing as “expressive conduct” and “hybrid speech” under article 
I, section 3, but largely echoed the United States Supreme Court in 
observing that an ordinance banning nude dancing “can be viewed 
as a reasonable exercise of the municipality’s police powers” and 
that any “curtailment of free expression is nominal and incidental 
and insufficient to cancel the public welfare concerns of the 
community.”250  Chief Justice Keith purported to join the court’s 
opinion, but in a special concurrence doubted whether article I, 
section 3 protected nude dancing in public places,251 and in so 
doing, arguably deprived Knudtson of precedential force. 
A dissent by Justice Sandra S. Gardebring, joined by Justices 
 
 246. 481 N.W.2d 51, 55, 57 (Minn. 1992).  The anti-obscenity statute, section 
617.241 of Minnesota Statutes, mirrors the First Amendment definition of 
obscenity: “the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex and 
depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner sexual contact . . . which, taken 
as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”  
MINN. STAT. 617.241, subd. 1(a) (2004); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 
(1973) (defining obscenity). 
 247. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d at 56, 57; see also Mark D. Salsbury, Note, 
Questions of Vagueness and State Constitutional Legitimacy: The State Constitutional 
Challenge to Minnesota’s Obscenity Statute: State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 
1992), 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 318 (1992) (criticizing Davidson as “expos[ing] 
Minnesota Constitutional analysis to attack as being arbitrary and selective”). 
 248. See Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1994). 
 249. Id. at 167. 
 250. Id. at 169; see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566, 568 
(1991) (characterizing nudity as “expressive conduct” on the “outer perimeters of 
the First Amendment,” which may be regulated to further “societal order and 
morality”). 
 251. Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 170 (Keith, C.J., concurring). 
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Esther M. Tomljanovich and Alan C. Page, called the majority’s 
opinion a “staggering departure from our history of providing 
significant protection of individual rights under the state 
constitution.”252  Justice Gardebring characterized the holding as 
“frightening” and feared it would “make the Minnesota 
Constitution largely irrelevant to the ongoing debate on the 
parameters of free speech in this country”: 
The rule of law announced today may not appear 
dangerous to a free society when applied to nude dancing, 
but it is no less available in the constitutional analysis of 
other types of speech.  The majority, with scant analysis, 
has abandoned a worthy history of providing significant 
protection for individual rights under the state’s 
constitution and approved an unprecedented and 
frightening approach to free speech analysis.253 
Given this discord, the fact that only Justice Page (a Knudtson 
dissenter) remains on the court, the shifts in the United States 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment analyses, the localized nature of 
nude dancing, and the general willingness of nude-dancing 
establishments to pay for litigation, it seems likely, if not necessary, 
that these state constitutional standards will be reconsidered. 
Minnesota courts might find guidance in Oregon, where in 
2005 the state supreme court referenced the state constitution’s 
“sweeping” right to free expression and employed established state 
constitutional precedent to invalidate a state law and local 
ordinance restricting sexually oriented public nudity.254  The 
Oregon court acknowledged that even unpopular expression must 
be protected under the state constitution: “[T]he words are so clear 
and sweeping that we think we would not be keeping faith with the 
framers who wrote them if we were to qualify or water them down, 
unless the historical record demonstrated clearly that the framers 
meant something other than what they said.”255 
 
 252. Id. at 170 (Gardebring, J., dissenting). 
 253. Id. at 172. 
 254. State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 629 (Or. 2005); City of Nyssa v. 
Dufloth, 121 P.3d 639, 642 (Or. 2005).  The Oregon Constitution provides that 
“[n]o law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting 
the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person 
shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.”  OR.  CONST. art I. § 8. 
 255. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d at 629.  “[I]t appears to us to be beyond reasonable 
dispute that the protection extends to the kinds of expression that a majority of 
citizens in many communities would dislike—profanity, blasphemy, 
pornography—and even to physical acts, such as nude dancing or other explicit 
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F.  Commercial Speech 
Commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection 
than social, political, or religious speech, and under the United 
States Supreme Court’s Central Hudson test may be regulated if it is 
unlawful and misleading and if regulation would further a 
substantial governmental interest.256  Given the multi-jurisdictional 
nature of commerce, relying solely on the state constitution to 
resolve commercial speech cases seems imprudent.  Nevertheless, 
in 1992 the Minnesota Supreme Court examined article I, section 3 
twice in the commercial speech context and incorporated Central 
Hudson into the state constitutional analysis.257 
In Minnesota League of Credit Unions v. Minnesota Department of 
Commerce, the court again signaled that article I, section 3 may 
provide greater protection than the First Amendment, but 
concluded that Central Hudson adequately protected the parties’ 
rights.258  Less than five months later, in State v. Casino Marketing 
Group, Inc., the chance that article I, section 3 would be interpreted 
independent from the First Amendment for commercial speech 
dissipated when the supreme court proclaimed its “general accord” 
with Central Hudson and found “no reason” to interpret the state 
constitution differently.259  But the Oregon Supreme Court deviated 
 
sexual conduct, that have an expressive component.”  Id. 
 256. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the 
United States Supreme Court set a four-part test for determining whether 
government may regulate or otherwise restrict commercial speech: (1) the lawful 
or misleading nature of the speech, (2) the government interest’s substantiality, 
(3) whether the regulation directly advances the government’s interest, and (4) 
whether the regulation “is not more extensive than necessary to serve that 
interest.”  447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001) (characterizing Central Hudson as “an adequate basis for 
decision” and clarifying that the standard of the fourth prong of the test is not the 
“least restrictive means” but a narrowly tailored “reasonable fit” between the ends 
and the means).  The Minnesota Supreme Court has defined commercial speech 
as “expression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its 
audience” that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction, such as 
price advertising.”  State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Minn. 
1981) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
 257. See Minn. League of Credit Unions v. Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, 486 
N.W.2d 399, 403-04 (Minn. 1992); State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 
882, 883-84, 885 n.2, 892 (Minn. 1992). 
 258. 486 N.W.2d at 403-04.  The case involved a rule allowing the state to 
secure a statement from credit unions agreeing to nonsolicitation of certain 
members.  Id. at 401. 
 259. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d at 883-84, 885 n.2, 892.  At issue was a law 
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from Central Hudson in a telemarketer-regulation case factually 
similar to Casino Marketing Group and invalidated a state law solely 
on state constitutional grounds.260 
G. Gaps in Coverage 
A few words are necessary on areas parallel to the First 
Amendment where the Minnesota Constitution provides no 
protections.  Due to an apparent oversight during the 1857 
constitutional conventions, there is no state constitutional right to 
assembly. 261  And thus far, Minnesota state restrictions on campaign 
financing and lobbying have been resolved only under the First 
Amendment.262  But the most remarkable gap is the lack of a 
provision or a definitive state-constitutional interpretation 
concerning defamation, one of the most important, controversial, 
and confusing intersections between state tort law and 
constitutional law.263 
In defamation decisions spanning three centuries, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has barely mentioned the state 
constitution despite article I, section 3’s specific provision that 
speakers and the press are to be “responsible for the abuse” of their 
speech.264  The court has bowed to federal law, including the 
 
barring telemarketers from using automatic dialing machines unless the 
telephone subscriber consented to receive the messages or a live operator 
preceded the prerecorded message.  MINN. STAT. § 325E.27 (1992). 
 260. Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284, 1285, 1287-88 (Or. 1993). 
 261. At the conventions, Democrats and Republicans included peaceful-
assembly provisions in their versions of the constitution, but the document 
emerging from conference committee contained no such provision and “no one 
chanced to notice the omission and the constitution was adopted without 
guaranteeing this right.”  MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 7, at 2; accord ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 118; cf. WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (right 
to assemble and petition).  A Minnesota Constitutional Study Commission 
convened in 1971 recommended that a freedom of assembly provision be added, 
but a provision was not added.  See Comments on the Restructured Constitution of 1974, 
in 1 MINN. STAT. ANN., supra note 77, at 129, 138. 
 262. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (invalidating 1993 
alterations to state campaign finance laws under First Amendment); Minn. State 
Ethical Practices Bd. v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1985), cert 
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986) (holding that Minnesota law requiring lobbyists to 
register does not violate First Amendment right of association). 
 263. “The law of defamation is a complex mix of competing interests, and has 
not been viewed by legal scholars as either rational or clear in application . . . .”  
Bolton v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 540 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Minn. 1995). 
 264. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; accord WIS. CONST. art I, § 3 (addressing criminal 
libel actions); see also RABBAN, supra note 183, at 155 (explaining that provision 
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“actual malice” standard from New York Times v. Sullivan,265 or has 
avoided constitutional issues altogether by turning to statutory or 
common law.266  But the New York Times principles came from state 
defamation law, 267 which in Minnesota protected good-faith 
defamatory statements against public officials decades before New 
York Times was decided.268 
Because defamation, like obscenity and commercial speech, 
increasingly occurs across and without regard to jurisdictional 
boundaries, relying solely on the state constitution to resolve 
defamation cases seems unwise.269  But if the United States Supreme 
 
addressing abuse of speech right is “often invoked in libel and contempt cases” in 
other states). 
 265. The Court held that the First Amendment requires a showing of “actual 
malice” before a state may use tort law to prevent or punish criticism of public 
officials.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964); see also Beatty v. 
Republican Herald Publ’g Co., 189 N.W.2d 182, 184, 291 Minn. 34, 37 (1971) 
(“State laws of libel and slander were drastically curtailed by the case of Sullivan vs. 
New York Times.”); Note, Minnesota Defamation Law and the Constitution, First 
Amendment Limitation on the Common Law Torts of Libel and Slander, 3 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1977).  Minnesota is not unique in bowing to federal law: “the 
briefs and literature rarely, if ever, mention the state constitutions.”  Linde, supra 
note 27, at 384. 
 266. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667, 675 (Minn. 
2003) (requiring a newspaper reporter, under section 595.025 of Minnesota 
Statutes, to disclose the identity of a confidential source in a defamation action to 
which reporter was not a party); Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 648-49, 
652-54 (Minn. 2003) (referencing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964)); Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 327-329 
(Minn. 2000) (tracing federal history of defamation law); Richie v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 27-28 (Minn. 1996); Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 
N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn. 1990) (“While first amendment and other policy 
considerations underlie this restraint [against punishing even some defamatory 
statements], we note our decision here is rooted in state defamation law.”). 
 267. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.20 (citing state decisions including Friedell v. 
Blakely Printing Co., 203 N.W. 974, 975, 163 Minn. 226, 230 (1925)). 
 268. Friedell, 203 N.W. at 975, 163 Minn. at 231 (1925); see also Note, supra note 
265, at 114 (observing that N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan did not have large impact in 
the state “because Minnesota had adopted, decades before, a rule giving special 
protection to criticism of public officials”). 
 269. See, e.g., Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002), cert. denied, 538 
U.S. 906 (2003).  In Griffis, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not permit 
enforcement of an Alabama defamation judgment against a Minnesota defendant 
who had posted allegedly defamatory remarks about an Alabama resident on an 
internet newsgroup.  Id. at 530, 536.  The court determined that Alabama did not 
have personal jurisdiction over the Minnesota defendant:  “The fact that messages 
posted to the newsgroup could have been read in Alabama, just as they could have 
been read anywhere in the world, cannot suffice to establish Alabama as the focal 
point of the defendant’s conduct.”  Id. at 536. 
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Court begins dismantling New York Times and its progeny, article I, 
section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution should be used to ensure 
that Minnesotans may “freely speak, write and publish their 
sentiments” on public officials and public concerns.270 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Constitution’s provisions on speech and 
religion protected Minnesotans decades before the First 
Amendment did.  But when faced with a state constitutional claim 
involving religion or speech, the state’s courts too often ignore the 
constitution’s plain language to focus their analyses on the elusive 
“framers’ intent” and the arguably irrelevant inquiry of whether 
there is sound reason to depart from the First Amendment. 
But shifts in First Amendment ideology are lurking, and the 
Establishment Clause risks becoming a miasma.  Rewind to 1990, 
when the United States Supreme Court redefined parameters of 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Minnesota Supreme Court led the 
nation by wielding its state constitution in response.271  The 
Minnesota Constitution’s plain language protecting speech should 
no longer be ignored.  For guidance, Minnesota might look to 
Oregon, where the state constitution’s “sweeping” independent 
protection for expression was recently reaffirmed.272  It is time for 
the mist to lift and the “renaissance of constitutional recognition” 
that Judge Nordby described in 2002 to spread to cases involving 
establishment of religion and speech. 
 
 270. New York has taken this tack.  See Immuno AG v. J. Moor-Jankowski, 567 
N.E.2d 1270, 1281 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991). 
 271. See Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 854, 854 n.69 (1992) (observing that “[s]ome state 
courts will do no better than the federal courts, but some will do much better”—
including, judging by Hershberger and French, the Minnesota Supreme Court); 
McConnell, supra note 16, at 1417 (observing in 1990 article that “legitimacy of 
[free exercise] doctrine has increasingly come under attack, and the survival of 
the principle of free exercise exemptions is very much in doubt”). 
 272. The Oregon Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a two-part test for 
determining whether a law violates the state constitution’s speech provision: (1) 
does the law restrain or restrict speech or expression, and if so (2) is it not 
protected because it is “wholly confined within some historical exception that was 
well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were 
adopted”?  State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 621 (Or. 2005) (citing State v. 
Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 576 (Or. 1983)); see also City of Nyssa v. Dufloth, 121 
P.3d 639, 643-44 (Or. 2005).  But article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution 
must be distinguished because it commands that “[n]o law shall be passed 
restraining the free expression of opinion,” thereby requiring state action. 
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